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Abstract:    29 
Most of the worlds' marine fisheries are overexploited or endangered, including the New England  30 
groundfishery, once one of the world‘s most prolific. After 35 years of management, stock sizes and  31 
catches are lower now than ever. We argue that New England groundfishermen are caught in a prisoner‘s  32 
dilemma, from which they have failed to escape. We then suggest a set of policies to get these  33 
groudnfishermen out of their dilemma.  34 




Introduction  36 
The 21st century is opening on the specter of massive fisheries failure. Fully 69% of the  37 
world‘s marine fisheries are exploited at a level at or beyond the level corresponding to  38 
maximum sustainable yield (MSY) (Garcia and Newton 1997). One of those is the  39 
groundfisheries of the Gulf of Maine, once one of the world‘s most prolific fisheries.  40 
Groundfishing was the New World‘s earliest industry. Although this fishery has been under  41 
management for decades, the size of the stocks now is far smaller than it was when management  42 
began. What we are witnessing is both stock failure and management failure. In this paper, we  43 
will focus on answering the question: Why has groundfish management failed? As we shall see,  44 
groundfishermen are caught in a prisoner‘s dilemma, from which that have failed to escape. Until  45 
they do escape, this fishery will continue its downward spiral.   46 
  47 
The Fishermen’s Dilemma  48 
  49 
Conservation lies at the heart of any fishery management scheme. To present the starkest  50 
choice imaginable, consider just two conservation rules. Conservation rule I stand for the status  51 
quo. For the New England groundfishery, think of this as the traditional overexploitation of the  52 
fishery. Conservation rule II represents a better management scheme—of the sort that has been  53 
sought since the 1970s, a story we tell below.   54 
            Consider a set of n fishermen. We normalize their payoffs from following conservation  55 
rule I to be zero. By contrast, if every fisherman follows conservation rule II, the benefit is b and  56 
the cost is c. Since conservation rule II represents better management, we have   57 
           b – c > 0                                                                                                                          (1)  58 
It pays if every fisherman follows conservation rule II.    59 
If things were this simple, then the fishermen would just adopt conservation rule II and there  60 
would be no downward spiral. This is where the dilemma comes in.   61 
            Let x(i) be fisherman i‘s strategy, which takes on two values: x(i) = 1 if fisherman i  62 
follows conservation rule II, and  x(i) = 0 if i follows conservation rule I. Finally, let X be the  63 
sum of the x(i). This notation suffices to track the strategies employed in the game.  64 
Let u(i) be fisherman i‘s payoff function.  65 




       = (X/n)b                    if x(i) = 0.  67 
The idea here is that the full benefit b of following conservation rule II is only achieved if  68 
everyone in the fishery follows that rule. Otherwise, the benefit is proportional to the number  69 
following the rule. If everyone follows conservation rule I, then X = 0 and the payoff for each  70 
fisherman is 0. There are two cases to consider, depending on whether b/n > c or b/n < c.  71 
             When b/n > c, fisherman I has an incentive to follow conservation rule II even if no one  72 
else does. His payoff is (1/n)b –c  > 0, which is better than conservation rule I pays. This  73 
inequality applies to every player, and the result is a Nash equilibrium x* of the game with x*(i)  74 
= 1 for every fisherman. The benefit to conservation rule II is so great that every fisherman  75 
adopts it on his own. Unfortunately for the New English fishery, this is not the case that applies.   76 
              Now suppose b/n < c . Fisherman I has no incentive to follow conservation rule II if no  77 
one else does. since (1/n)b  – c < 0, which he would get from following conservation rule I.  78 
So there is a Nash equilibrium x* with x*(i) = 0 for all i. Plus, the same algebra applies to values  79 
of X greater than 0. So the Nash equilibrium we have identified is unique. This is the Prisoner‘s  80 
Dilemma the fishermen face: x*(i) = 0 for all I is a strictly dominant strategy that leads to an  81 
inefficient outcome.  82 
It is hard to get out of a prisoner‘s dilemma, as the experience of these fishermen will  83 
show. The most popular way theoretically is to let the players play the game repeatedly forever.  84 
In this case, if they are sufficiently patient, then there exists a Nash equilibrium supporting  85 
conservation rule II. Unfortunately, these fishermen don‘t have the luxury of infinity---the fish  86 
won‘t last that long. A way that often works experimentally is to let the subjects communicate  87 
with each other; they talk their way out of the dilemma. As we shall see, there has been no dearth  88 
of communication among all involved in this fishery, the dilemma persists. At the end of the  89 
paper, we propose a quite different maneuver from infinite play or communication, namely  90 
social preferences, which have proved promising in other contexts and might help the fishermen  91 
escape their dilemma here. We now take a detailed look at this fishery and its recent  92 
management history.  93 
  94 
The Groundfishery and its Management  95 
The groundfishery is very heterogenous. Not only are different types of gear used (trawls,  96 




120-footers that remain at sea for weeks at a time. Electronic gear, fish-cooling apparatus, crew  98 
size, and vessel configuration also vary. Ground-fishing vessels are highly mobile and sell their  99 
catches in a number of ports. Some of the smaller boats concentrate on inshore grounds within  100 
50 miles of their home harbors; the larger vessels roam widely over the Gulf of Maine and  101 
beyond. Crews of groundfishing vessels are part of a social network, but people in the network  102 
do not all interact, and many vessels fishing on the same grounds are from different harbors and  103 
have crews that scarcely know each other. Although biologists know that factors such as water  104 
temperature, salinity, and predation by mammals have played a role in the decline of groundfish  105 
stocks, there is a consensus among them that the major problem has been overexploitation by  106 
human beings (Sinclair and Murawski 1997).  107 
Groundfishing was the New World‘s earliest industry, and what is present day New  108 
England played a prominent role in that industry (Lear 1998). In New England, catches reached  109 
their peak about 1860 (O'Leary 1996). Since that time, catches have varied, but the general trend  110 
has been downward (Ackerman 1941). Now, the entire Gulf of Maine only produces 6% of the  111 
fish that were produced in Blue Hill Bay of Maine in the 1860s (Alexander et. al. 2009).  112 
Despite the long-term decline, throughout most of the history of the United States  113 
fisheries were managed by the states, which typically had few regulations on the groundfishery.  114 
There was no management at all of the offshore groundfishery in the northwest Atlantic until  115 
1947 when the International Commission for the North Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) was formed.  116 
The commission had 11 signatories, including the United States, Canada, Great Britain, the  117 
USSR, and other European nations. Although ICNAF attempted to manage by allocating quotas,  118 
ICNAF regulations were not stringent enough, nor were they well enough enforced, to prevent  119 
over exploitation of the stocks (Acheson 1984).  120 
In the 1960s , the Gulf of Maine was invaded by a large fleet of trawlers and factory ships  121 
that quickly overexploited stocks of herring, cod, haddock, hake, whiting, and flounder (Playfair  122 
2003). By 1972, the groundfish stocks in the Gulf of Maine were so depleted that the foreign  123 
fleets left the Gulf of Maine (Acheson 1984).   124 
The federal government of the United States began to manage the groundfisheries after  125 
the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act [FCMA] was passed by the U.S. Congress in  126 
1976. This law gave the federal government authority to manage all fish species from the 3-mile  127 




line (Maine Commercial Fisheries 1973). The passage of this act was initially greeted with  129 
enthusiasm by fishermen, who believed it would end competition by the foreign fleets in the Gulf  130 
of Maine, and by conservationists and managers, who believed it would end overexploitation of  131 
badly depleted fish stocks. Within weeks of its passage, industry support for the law began to  132 
erode when fishermen discovered that the law gave the federal government power to regulate  133 
them. Implementation of this law went forward with increasing disillusionment and extreme  134 
resistance.  135 
Under the FCMA, the United States and its territories are divided into eight coastal zones.  136 
Each zone has a regional council composed the heads of the state fisheries agencies from the  137 
states, a representative of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), a representative of the  138 
U.S. Coast Guard, and of representatives of the states, usually from the fishing industry,  139 
appointed by the governors of the states involved. The FCMA was designed to include fishermen  140 
in the councils so that the councils would have the benefit of their local level knowledge about  141 
the complex fisheries in each council zone.   142 
The regional councils propose management plans for each species of fish to the Secretary  143 
of Commerce, who, with the advice of the NMFS, rejects or accepts these plans. Accepted plans  144 
are published in the Federal Register and are enforced by federal agencies, including the Coast  145 
Guard.   146 
The policy of the federal government was to accomplish three goals. First, the  147 
establishment of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), popularly known as the 200-mile-limit law,  148 
was designed to keep most foreign boats out of U.S. waters. Second, the federal government  149 
aimed to expand and modernize the fishing fleet, which resulted in the establishing the capital  150 
construction fund and the Fishing Vessel Obligation Guarantee Program (Apollonio and Dykstra  151 
2008). Third, the federal government wanted to conserve fish stocks in the EEZ and passed the  152 
FCMA with this goal in mind. As we shall see, the policy was successful in removing the foreign  153 
fleets from U.S. waters and in building up the U.S. fishing fleet. Attempts to conserve the fish  154 
stocks, however, have been an abject failure.   155 
Groundfish management has been enormously complicated. Many plans have been tried,  156 
involving virtually every kind of management tool from quotas and gear restrictions to seasons  157 
and closed areas. The management plans have been modified in several ways. In addition, the  158 




various plans involved different combinations of groups and organizations with different  160 
interests. The New England Regional Council, the NMFS, factions of fishermen, conservation  161 
groups, members of the U.S. Congress, local politicians, scientists, and the courts all played a  162 
role in devising and changing those plans. Unfortunately nothing seems to have worked.  163 
Groundfish stocks are in worse shape today than they were when management began.   164 
It would take several volumes to discuss every facet of groundfish management in detail.  165 
In this section, we will cover only the most important groundfish management plans, the political  166 
pressures bringing them about, the management tools employed, and the results.  167 
  168 
Three-Month Quota Plan (TMQ): 1977-1979   169 
Under the FCMA, the first management plan on the most important species of groundfish  170 
(i.e., cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder) went into effect in March 1987. The TMQ plan was  171 
drafted by the NMFS with no input from the council, a highhanded action that presaged trouble  172 
between the two (Dewar 1983). The management tools employed were seasonal quotas and trip  173 
quotas. A catch quota was established for each species for a three-month period, and when the  174 
quota was reached, fishing was halted. No limited-entry system was imposed; anyone who  175 
wanted a license got one.   176 
The TMQ plan created a good deal of opposition in the industry, due in great part to the  177 
fact that the regional council used its closure powers repeatedly so that one day it would be legal  178 
to catch fish, the next day it would not. Rules changed so rapidly that a crisis atmosphere was  179 
created, and fishermen had a hard time keeping up with them (Barlow 1978). The fishermen not  180 
only lobbied against the TMQ plan, but also cheated massively (Acheson 1984). By the summer  181 
of 1979, many fishermen and council members had to admit they did not know how many fish  182 
were being caught; the TMQ was a failure.  183 
After several months of discussion, the council decided to impose an ―interim plan,‖  184 
which was intended to last only for a short time until a permanent plan could be put in place. Its  185 
main features were mesh size regulations, minimum fish sizes, and closed areas on spawning  186 
grounds (Barlow 1980; Morrison 1980). The interim plan was put into effect in 1982 and lasted  187 
until 1986.   188 
  189 




In 1980, even while the interim plan was in effect, the regional council began to develop  191 
a radically different plan that they hoped would be more effective. The plan abandoned the idea  192 
of using quotas, which had proven to be impossible to enforce, and proposed rules that promised  193 
to be more acceptable to the industry.   194 
1n 1985 the Atlantic Demersal Fisheries Plan (ADF) was proposed by the council. It  195 
included mesh sizes, closed areas, and seasonal limits—the kinds of rules that had the most  196 
support in the industry (see section on attitudes below) (Stevens 1985). It was the result of years  197 
of discussion in which council members were heavily lobbied by various industry groups.   198 
In March 1986, the NMFS ―completely disapproved‖ of the plan and directed the New  199 
England Regional Council to develop a new plan giving ―serious consideration to a quota  200 
system, limited entry, and a larger minimum fish and mesh sizes‖ (Stevens 1986a:1A). The  201 
industry was outraged. The council stuck to its guns and insisted that its plan was a good one,  202 
and after a few months the NMFS gave partial approval of the council‘s plan for a year (Stevens  203 
1986b). At that point the NMFS and the Secretary of Commerce began to develop their own  204 
groundfish plan (Stevens 1987). NMFS officials stated that their plan would not be put into  205 
effect if the council could develop a plan that would conserve groundfish.   206 
This situation posed a jurisdictional dispute. The council assumed that it had the authority  207 
to manage the fishery; the NMFS assumed it had ultimate authority, including the right to  208 
promulgate plans when it deemed council action inadequate. Politicians, particularly the  209 
congressional delegations from Massachusetts and Rhode Island, sided with the council and the  210 
industry and requested that the NMFS cease development of any secretarial plan (Studds and  211 
Young 1987). The NMFS complied, but the resulting plan was, in the words of one NMFS  212 
official, ―very watered down.‖  213 
In 1988, within two years after the ADF plan was put into effect, a new stock assessment  214 
showed that the cod stock was in serious trouble due to high fishing effort (New England Fishery  215 
Management Council 1988). The technical monitoring group ―recommended slashing effort by  216 
more than 50%‖ (Stevens 1989:46). At this point, the council began to appreciate the seriousness  217 
of the situation, but it still acquiesced to the demands of industry for lenient rules (Stevens 1988).   218 
  219 




Since the ADF plan was put into place in 1986, it has been extended by 16 amendments  221 
(major changes) and 44 frameworks (minor changes). Each amendment put new restrictions on  222 
fishing in response to evidence of stock failure. The most important amendments are described in  223 
Table 1.   224 




Table 1. Atlantic Demersal Finfish Plan, Key Amendments  226 
Amendment 
Date 
Passed  Management Mechanism Used  Impetus for Passage 
5  1993 
Moratorium on new vessel permits; changes 
in mesh sizes; two large closed areas on 
Georges Bank; established a days-at-sea 
program (to limit the number of fishing days 
each vessel was allowed to fish) (New 
England Fishery Management Council 
1992). 
Conservation Law Foundation 1991 lawsuit 
(New England Fishery Management Council 
1992). 
7  1996 
Objective was to cut  fishing effort for cod, 
haddock, and yellowtail flounder by 
reducing total allowable catches, setting trip 
limits, and reducing days at sea. 
Stock assessment showed need to cut effort by 80%  
from 1993 levels (Apollonio and Dykstra 2008: 
Plante 1996a) 
9  1998 
Established a new definition of overfishing; 
set new management goals for 12 
groundfish species.  
Cut effort to bring plan into compliance with the 
Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996 (Plante 1998c) 
13  2003 
Habitat protection; new stock rebuilding 
timetables; days-at-sea program, with A, B, 
and C days. 
Conservation Law Foundation 2002 lawsuit 
(Hall-Arber 2006; Commercial Fishery News 
2003). 
16  2010 
Sectors (plan would allow groups of 
fishermen to get an allocation of fish and 
promulgate their own rules to allocate it 
among themselves) and annual catch limits 
Widespread recognition that Amendment 13 was 




Increasing Fishing Effort and Declining Catches  227 
The job of the council and NMFS was made more difficult by actions of the federal  228 
government, which increased the number of boats and vessel tonnage in the Gulf of Maine.  229 
(Apollonio and Dykstra 2008). In 1977, 1,200 licenses were issued, whereas in 1979, the number  230 
was increased to 2,191—an 83% increase (Acheson 1984). Federal loan programs facilitated the  231 
entry of new vessels.   232 
Changes in the international boundary also increased fishing pressure. In 1984, the  233 
International Court in The Hague drew a new international boundary between the U.S. and  234 
Canada in the Gulf of Maine that excluded American fishermen from waters they had used for  235 
centuries, including the Grand Banks, the Gulf of Saint Lawrence, Labrador, and even parts of  236 
the Gulf of Maine. American vessels crowded into the in-shore waters of the Gulf of Maine,  237 
where, by 1986, they considerably reduced the stocks of groundfish (Lannin 1988). While the  238 
NMFS and the council were attempting to limit fishing effort, the actions of the international  239 
court and the loan agencies had the opposite effect (Acheson 1984).   240 
From 1984 to 1988 severe reductions in total catches were experienced as stocks became  241 
overfished (Figure 1). The catches of many species declined 30% to 50% between 1982 and  242 
1988 (Lannin 1988). Stocks reached their lowest point in 1994, explained population dynamicist  243 
Vaughn Anthony, because ―the spawning stock has collapsed‖ (Plante 1994:11A). Stocks have  244 
remained low ever since despite all attempts by the council and NMFS to revive them. As stricter  245 
regulations have gone into effect, effort has declined also. In 1960, there was no limit on the  246 
number of days that a vessel could fish; by 1994 boats were restricted to 88 days at sea, and by  247 
2009, some boats were restricted to 20 days fishing per year (Bangor Daily News 2009).  248 
Declining catches and ever more stringent effort restrictions have produced a precipitous decline  249 
in the number of boats in the New England groundfish fleet, from 343 in 1978 to 50 in 2009  250 
(Acheson et al. 1980; Mack 2010).   251 
Lately, management efforts may be bearing fruit. In 2007, NMFS scientists announced  252 
that ―cod were no longer overfished‖ (Plante 2008:8A).   253 
  254 
Political and Other Factors   255 
A number of political factors have affected groundfish management.  256 




Industry Opposition    258 
The industry lobbied the council continuously to get rules it could live with, but failed.  259 
As a result, every action of the council, the NMFS, or the Secretary of Commerce met with  260 
political agitation: heated hearings, visits from congressmen, letters to newspapers and public  261 
officials (Miller and van Maanan 1979). Members of the council admitted to feeling  262 
threatened—particularly in the late 1990s when council meetings became especially ugly. Every  263 
amendment was challenged by lawsuits by fishermen against officers of the NMFS or the  264 
Secretary of Commerce (Plante 1996b, 1999). Sometimes these pressure tactics worked to  265 
reverse council and NMFS management decisions.   266 
  267 
Industry Factions   268 
The groundfishing industry is divided into a number of factions that rarely can attain  269 
consensus. One group would work for management goals that would benefit it at the expense of  270 
other types of groundfishermen (Plante 1998a, 1998b). The conflict between small and large boat  271 
owners over Amendments 13 and 16 was especially bitter. As a result, the industry as a whole  272 
could rarely unite to promote or oppose any management measure.  273 
  274 
Cheating and Enforcement Problems     275 
There has always been as good deal of cheating. The TMQ plan (1978-1980) failed in  276 
great part because of massive law enforcement problems, and widespread cheating continues  277 
today. King and Sutinen (2010:7) estimate that ―from 12 to 24% of the total harvest is taken  278 
illegally.‖ This has an adverse effect on the health of the stock. King and Sutinen (2010) report  279 
many fishermen believe illegal fishing will prevent them from ever benefiting from stock- 280 
rebuilding programs.   281 
  282 
Long-Delayed Action    283 
 Management plans developed slowly. One factor was extreme bureaucratic  284 
complexity—a ―paperwork nightmare‖ according to Apollonio and Dykstra (2008:73), which  285 
required years to complete all legal and federal bureaucratic procedures. In addition, the  286 
jurisdictional conflict between the council and the NMFS delayed the development of the interim  287 




delay. Council members who were fishermen were especially susceptible to industry pressure to  289 
move slowly. John Williamson, a fishermen member of the New England Regional Council,  290 
said: "There was often a coalition for taking it easy.  Keep things moving in the right direction,  291 
but go slow" was their motto. After 1992, much of the council‘s ability to set its own timetable  292 
was reduced by the two Conservation Law Foundation lawsuits, which meant that the  293 
development of Amendments 5 and 13 was set by the court (Plante 1991). The reauthorizations  294 
of the FCMA, which gave greater power to the NMFS, added further delay (Stevens 1995,  295 
1996). Even between 1977 and 1994, when management decisions were primarily in the hands of  296 
the council, effective rules to reduce fishing effort were slow in coming. It was in this period that  297 
stocks fell precipitously (see Figure 1). One NMFS scientist said that delay permitted stocks to  298 
fall far more than they would have had stricter rules been imposed earlier.  299 
   300 
Summary of Council Politics  301 
In reality, the New England Regioanl Council was pushed in many different directions by  302 
groups ranging from industry factions and scientists to NMFS administrators and the courts. Self  303 
interest, loyalty to friends in the industry, scientific data, court orders, the wishes of bureaucratic  304 
and political superiors, and genuine concern for the common good, all played a role in  305 
influencing the decisions of New England Regional Council members. Sometimes the council  306 
responded to an organization or coalition from below, while at other times it responded to  307 
pressures from above.  308 
However, a number of observers have argued that the composition of the New England  309 
Regional Council doomed it to failure. Eagle et al. (2003) argue that council members who are  310 
fishermen stand to gain financially from council decisions and have significant conflicts of  311 
interest (Weber 2002). This type of organization puts the fox in charge of the hen house. On the  312 
whole, the council system has not worked well in New England. However, it is difficult to make  313 
the case that having fishermen on the councils is the reason for that failure. The majority of  314 
people on the New England Regional Council are not fishermen, and the fishermen do not vote  315 
as a block, nor do they always vote with their own self interests in mind (Apollonio and Dykstra  316 
2008). If the council had been captured by the industry, then the industry should have gotten the  317 




were exactly those that the industry opposed (e.g., quotas and the days-at-sea program of  319 
Amendments 5 and 13).  320 
While many of the factors leading to management failure in the New England  321 
groundfishery are political, there were other important factors that played a role.   322 
  323 
Technical and Biological Characteristics of the Fishery   324 
 Some resources are easier to manage than others (Schlager et al. 1999; Ostrom 2000a).  325 
The combination of fishing technology and biology of the species involved make groundfish  326 
particularly difficult to manage. Groundfishing gear is highly unselective. Ottar trawls take all  327 
sizes of fish, including juveniles and those with eggs. When groundfish are hauled to the surface  328 
from any depth, their swim bladders break and they die. A high percentage of all fish caught in  329 
ottar trawls and gillnets, the most commonly used techniques, come aboard dead.   330 
  331 
Science and the Views of Fishermen  332 
Groundfishermen have little faith in the quality of science behind fisheries management  333 
plans. In our 2009 survey of people who had held groundfishing licenses in the 1970s, we asked  334 
them to respond to the statement: ―I have faith in the quality of federal science.‖ Of the 96  335 
people who responded, only seven (7%) agreed, whereas 67 (68%) disagreed. There are two  336 
reasons for lack of faith.   337 
First, the fishermen view the ocean differently from scientists. Groundfishermen see the  338 
ocean as a chaotic environment, in which fish stocks change rapidly and unpredictably in  339 
response to a variety of factors. Fishing effort is only one factor affecting the size of stocks, and  340 
in the view of fishermen, it may not be the most important one. From the fishermen‘s  341 
perspective, the goal of management should be to protect fish in vulnerable parts of their life  342 
cycle, (i.e., to protect small fish, gravid fish, and essential spawning and nursery grounds) by  343 
enacting mesh-size regulations and/or closures (Acheson and Wilson 1996). Scientists, by  344 
contrast, view management in terms of stock-recruitment models, which posit a mathematical  345 
relationship between fishing effort, the size of the breeding stock and recruitment. The size of the  346 
stock can be managed by controlling fishing pressure by human beings. Thus, they favor  347 
management by quotas, days at sea, license limits, and other strategies to limit the number of fish  348 




Second, fishermen do not believe that scientists know how many fish there are. Because  350 
fishermen often come upon large concentrations of fish, they base their judgment on those and  351 
assume that there are far more fish available than scientists say. Fishermen also distrust the  352 
methods scientists use to collect fish population data (Commercial Fisheries News 2002).  353 
Despite their skepticism, however, the stock assessments behind groundfish management were  354 
reasonably good. To be sure, modeling fish stocks is difficult, but an independent peer-review  355 
panel said that the work of the NMFS‘s laboratory at Woods Hole was ―scientifically sound‖  356 
(Plante 2003a). With rare exceptions, the scientists have said that most groundfish stocks have  357 
been overfished. They were almost certainly correct.   358 
There are serious questions about the management rules that have been imposed. Some  359 
analysts argue that the conservation of the groundfish stocks would be better served if the rules  360 
focused on conserving the fish in vulnerable parts of their life cycle (e.g., breeding stock) rather  361 
than just cutting effort on all fish (Acheson and Wilson 1996). Others argue that groundfish are  362 
concentrated in local stocks so that management efforts need to be at a smaller scale. Rules  363 
designed to manage stocks in the entire Gulf of Maine set up the wrong incentives (Steneck and  364 
Wilson in press).  365 
In a 1978 survey of fishermen, we asked ―What kinds of regulations would you approve  366 
for your section of the industry?‖ We received a total of 72 different answers. These answers are  367 
coded and summarized in Table 2.  368 
  369 
  370 
  371 
  372 
  373 
  374 
  375 




Regulation   Maine and N.H.  Mass and R.I.  Total 
No regulation  22 (11.5%)  41 (32.0%)  63(19.8%) 
Limited entry  8 (4.2%)  11 (8.5%)  19 (5.9%) 
Closed area or season  20 (10.5%)  4 (3.1%)  24 (7.5%) 
Mesh size rules   18 (9.4%)  10 (7.8%)  28 (8.8%) 
Import quotas  17 (8.5%)  0 (0%)  17 (5.4%) 
Ban efficient gear  9 (4.7%)  2 (1.5%)  11 (3.4%) 
Help marketing  9 (4.7%)  0 (0%)  9 (2.8%) 
Ban foreign boats  7 (3.6%)  6 (4.7%)  13 (4.0%) 
Less government  2 (1.0%)  6 (4.7%)  8 (2.2%) 
Quotas  2 (1.0%)  7 (5.4%)  9 (2.8%) 
Lobster regulations
a  23 (12%)  18 (14%)  41 (12.8) 
Gov‘t loans and aid  35 (18.4%)  13 (10.1%)  48 (15.0%) 
No information  18 (9.4%)  10 (7.8%)  28 (8.8%) 
Total  190  128  318 
  377 
aSome of these skippers were engaged in both groundfishing and lobstering during the annual round. These people  378 
were more concerned with lobster regulations than groundfishing rules; virtually all favored lobster trap limits or a  379 
change in the lobster size regulations. Source: Acheson 1984.   380 
We can draw several conclusions about the attitudes of groundfishermen from these data,  381 
conclusions that give insight into the difficulty the council faced in crafting a plan acceptable to  382 
the industry.   383 
First, many fishermen wanted no regulations and said they did not believe any were  384 
needed. Fully 20% said they wanted ―no regulations.‖   385 
Second, although the majority admitted that some kinds of rules were needed, there was  386 
no consensus on what regulations should be devised. Moreover, there was a good deal of  387 
variation on the kinds of regulations preferred in different parts of New England. The rules that  388 
were favored by the largest percentage of fishermen in New England as a whole were mesh sizes  389 
and closed areas and seasons, followed by limited entry and rules to limit the efficiency of  390 




Third, there was no support for the kinds of regulations that the regional council and  392 
NMFS had put in place in the first plan. Only 1% said they wanted a quota. More fishermen  393 
preferred rules on how fishing was done rather than how much fishing could be done.   394 
A large number of the fishermen interviewed recognized that the stocks were in  395 
difficulty, but they had serious doubts about the ability of the government and political system to  396 
solve the problems faced by the industry. They were pessimistic about the future of their industry  397 
and the ability of the government to address its problems.  398 
Although this study was done more than 30 years ago, the conclusions drawn from it  399 
apply today. A 2009 study by Acheson of 102 people who were in the groundfishery in the 1970s  400 
gives additional insights into the attitudes of groundfishermen. The majority of these people had  401 
left the industry; only seven of those in groundfishing in the 1970s were still in the fishery at the  402 
time of the survey. When asked about why they left groundfishing, 68% answered that they  403 
could not earn an adequate income in groundfishing. Some said ―no fish‖; others said ―poor  404 
income in groundfishing‖; and still others blamed ―the management system,‖ which prevented  405 
them from catching what fish they could.    406 
When asked whether they would like their children to enter groundfishing, only 17% said  407 
―yes,‖ whereas 51% said ―no.‖ When asked whether they agreed with the statement ―I have faith  408 
in the quality of federal science,‖ only 7% agreed or strongly agreed, and 68% did not agree or  409 
strongly disagreed. Sixty-one percent agreed or strongly agreed with the statement ―the state of  410 
the groundfishery is bad‖ and only 20% disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement. In  411 
short, these fishermen were pessimistic about the fishery, and the state of federal science. Most  412 
did not want their children to enter the business even though many of them come from families  413 
that have been in groundfishing for generations.  414 
Not surprisingly, advocates for the large boat fleet tell a different story. In testimony  415 
before the Marine Resources Committee of the Maine Legislature, a lobbyist stated, ―groundfish  416 
populations today are more robust than they have been in decades.… The New England  417 
groundfish industry is losing its economic viability because restrictions do not permit the full  418 
harvesting of the total allowable catch‖ (Raymond 2007). Despite decades of scientific evidence  419 
of severe stock decline, and hundreds of boats leaving the fishery, big boat owners want to  420 
harvest groundfish stocks more heavily than regulations allow. Such groundfishermen do not  421 




long as possible, and they hope the stocks of fish will last. Some fishermen have a more  423 
predatory attitude. One said in an interview, ―I want to take them [the fish] now. They are not  424 
going to be here in the future.‖   425 
  426 
  427 
The Downward Spiral   428 
A number of different management plans, ranging from quotas and gear restrictions to  429 
seasons, closed areas, days at sea, and sectors, have been tried on the groundfishery.  430 
Unfortunately, nothing seems to have succeeded.   431 
When management began in 1977, the stocks were already at low levels and fishing  432 
pressure was high. Stocks were further devastated by the invasion of large boats after imposition  433 
of the Hague Line in 1984. Fishing pressure on the stocks was increased further by the federal  434 
loan programs designed to build up the U.S. fleet, and the unselective fishing technology along  435 
with the biology of the fish leads to high mortality on all fish caught. Since the rules governing  436 
the groundfishery were not those that fishermen would have chosen, and fishermen were  437 
convinced these rules were costly, unenforceable, ineffective, and based on a false scientific  438 
model of how the ocean works, they responded to the rules with opposition, lawsuits, and a  439 
massive amount of illegal activity. This opposition, combined with bureaucratic complexity and  440 
jurisdictional disputes with the NMFS, caused the council to stall in imposing effective rules  441 
(Apollonio and Dykstra 2008). This delay was probably deadly.  442 
   Groundfishermen have a short-term perspective. Faced with falling stocks and ineffective  443 
management, they are not inclined to invest in conservation rules that have no assurance of  444 
working. Rather, they focus on staying in business in the short run and hope stocks will not be  445 
unduly damaged by fishing. Some have a gold rush mentality, with all that implies for a high  446 
discount rate strategy. The widespread cheating further undermines conservation efforts: those  447 
who conserve fish are sacrificing, while the rewards are being taken by the ―free riders.‖  448 
Groundfish management follows a familiar pattern. Scientists issue a stock assessment  449 
indicating that the stocks have fallen and tighter regulations are needed. The New England  450 
Regional Council and the NMFS, after years of deliberations and negotiations, put out new  451 
regulations. These are strongly opposed by the industry. After a time, the regulations prove  452 




that groundfishermen have about the poor quality of science and the ineffectiveness of the rules.  454 
A gold rush mentality, political opposition, ineffective regulations, and stock decline follow each  455 
other in an ever more desperate downward spiral.  456 
  457 
Escape from the Fisherman’s Dilemma   458 
  We remain optimistic that the downward spiral of the New England fishery can be  459 
stopped. To that end, the fishermen need to escape from their dilemma and choose a better  460 
conservation rule than the status quo. What would accomplish that is a thorough makeover of  461 
their attitudes to conservation. The technical term for that is ―social preferences,‖ where a  462 
player‘s payoff no longer depends just on his or her economic result, but more broadly on the  463 
overall outcome.     464 
To see the effect that social preferences can have on the fisherman‘s dilemma, consider the  465 
amended payoff function:  466 
u(i) = x(i)[ (X/n)b – c ]                                                                                                           (3)  467 
If x(i) = 1, this is the same as equation (2), but if  x(i) = 0, it is different.    468 
One way to express the difference is in equation (2) a fisherman gets full credit for free riding on  469 
the conservation efforts of the rest. In equation (3), by contrast, a fisherman gets no credit for  470 
free riding on the conservation efforts of the rest. Another way to express the difference is, ―We  471 
are all in this together. Either we adopt conservation rule II and get the full benefit, or we don‘t.  472 
And those who don‘t get excluded from that benefit.‖ In that way, (3) expresses a form of  473 
solidarity.  474 
             Let‘s look at the Nash equilibrium of (3), in the case when b/n < c. We still have the  475 
prisoner‘s dilemma equilibrium x*(i) = 0, where every fisherman chooses the conservation rule I,  476 
the status quo. However, one now has a good Nash equilibrium also, namely x*(i) = 1. This pays  477 
b – c > 0 to everyone. If player 1 deviates to x(1) = 0, he gets payoff 0 which is less. Hence, we  478 
have the good Nash equilibrium.  479 
What about between these two Nash equilibriums, one with X = n and the other with X = 0?  480 
One can show that there exists a unique integer m, such that:  481 
For X > m, deviation from x(i) = 1 does not pay and so best response dynamics leads to the good  482 




For X < m, deviation from x(i) = 0 does not pay and so best response dynamics leads to the bad  484 
Nash equilibrium.  485 
The New England groundfishermen have not escaped from their dilemma. Their situation  486 
stands in stark contrast to that of New England lobstermen, whose fishery is well managed and  487 
sustainable—no downward spiral there. A conservation ethic has played a key role in that  488 
fishery, as we argue elsewhere (Acheson and Gardner 2009).      489 
The groundfishery and the governance structure used to manage it have many of the  490 
characteristics that rational choice theory predicts will lead to an inability to devise effective  491 
rules to solve collective action problems.   492 
First, it is axiomatic among rational choice theorists that characteristics of the community  493 
involved play an important role in the development of norms and rules. People will be more  494 
likely to provide themselves with rules leading to joint benefits if they know each other's past  495 
performance, if the game is played repeatedly, and if the rules can be enforced (Elster 1989;  496 
North 1990; Ostrom 1990; Taylor 1990; Knight 1992; Ostrom 2000a, 2000b). Under these  497 
circumstances, people know who is likely to cooperate, can monitor behavior, and can sanction  498 
shirkers. For this reason, norms and rules are more likely to be produced by people in small,  499 
homogenous communities with a long history and a sense of community. Yet the groundfish  500 
industry has virtually none of these characteristics. Fishermen are scattered throughout New  501 
England and comprise a loose social network. Most do not know many other people in the  502 
industry, and they certainly do not form a community with a long history. Groundfishermen are  503 
heterogeneous. They fish for different species with different types of gear from different sizes of  504 
boats that stay at sea different lengths of time. There is also ethnic heterogeneity. As a result, it is  505 
virtually impossible to frame rules that everyone considers fair. Different factions have lobbied  506 
the regional council to get rules that benefit them at the expense of other factions of  507 
groundfishermen. There is nothing unusual in this situation (see Knight 1992), but these factional  508 
disputes have made it impossible for the industry to present a united front and has caused a good  509 
deal of conflict, particularly in the development of Amendments 13 and 16.   510 
Second, rational choice theorists have considerable evidence that effective resource  511 
management rules are likely to arise if local-level communities have a hand in developing the  512 
rules (Ostrom 2000b). People who are allowed to play a role in developing resource management  513 




impose undue costs. Such rules can be self-enforcing. The rules put in place to manage the  515 
groundfishery were put in place by the regional council, which was pushed in many different  516 
directions by the NMFS, judges, the U.S. Congress, scientists, conservationists, and industry  517 
factions. This is the antithesis of local participation.   518 
Third, the discount rate reflects people‘s assessment of probable future gains. If  519 
individuals do not gain the benefit of norms, they will not support efforts to generate them  520 
(Knight 1992). This means that if effective resource management rules are to be established, they  521 
must allow those who make the investment in the resource to benefit from that investment. If it is  522 
unlikely that resources will be there in the future or if efforts to invest in resources are likely to  523 
fail, there is little incentive to sacrifice current harvests for future rewards. Eric Alden Smith  524 
(2003: 421) neatly phrases the dynamics of this situation: ―higher payoffs from cooperative  525 
production mean a greater incentive to solve collective action problems, to ensure any needed  526 
coordination, and counter free riding.‖   527 
In the groundfishery, catches had been falling for decades, and fishermen were sure that  528 
the managers were using strategies that would be ineffective so that stocks would not likely  529 
increase. Under these circumstances, fishermen have every incentive to take the fish stocks now.  530 
  531 
What Rational Choice Theory Does Not Explain  532 
There are several factors that play a role in the failure to effectively manage the New  533 
England groundfish industry that have not been adequately studied by the rational choice  534 
theorists or other social scientists interested in institutional failure. Among the most prominent of  535 
those are delay and timing problems, technical and biological factors, and the scale at which  536 
management is attempted. Moreover, much of the literature on devising rules is devoted to  537 
understanding the conditions under which user groups will develop rules at the local level (i.e.,  538 
self regulation) (see Ostrom 1990). Less attention has been devoted to the role of government,  539 
bureaucracy and jurisdictional infighting. Last but not least, are ideational issues. The rational  540 
choice literature recognizes that values, cultural models, and ideology play a critical role in the  541 
development of norms and institutions (North 1990). Recently a growing body of literature is  542 
developing on this subject (e.g., Fehr and Gachter 2000; Henrich and Henrich 2007), which  543 
suggests that if the groundfishery is going to develop norms and institutions to manage the  544 




circles there is a growing conviction that successful management depends, in great part on  546 
fostering a sense of stewardship or a ―conservation ethic.‖ How such conservation ethics develop  547 
is a complicated matter, involving the interaction of a variety of variables over time (see  548 
Acheson and Gardner n.d). Certainly no such ethic has developed in the groundfish industry.  549 
This suggests that rational choice theory may need to be extended and modified to take such  550 
factors into account if it is going to succeed in explaining the development of rules and  551 
institutions to manage resources.   552 
  553 
  554 
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Figure 1. Catches of Cod, Haddock, and Yellowtail Flounder, Maine and New England,  691 
1950-2008 (millions of pounds)  692 
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Source: Author‘s chart, landings information generated from  695 
www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/st1/commercial/landings/annual_landings.html  696 
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